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NOTES
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: WHEN IS AN ACQUITTAL AN ACQUITTAL?
A fundamental principle of double jeopardy jurisprudence cautions pros-
ecutors that an acquittal in a criminal case, once received, will bar forever a
second prosecution for the same offense.' The notion that underlies this
fifth amendinent, 2
 post-acquittal protection is rudimentary to the American
criminal justice system. It is that the power to prosecute, if improperly exer-
cised, represents so significant a threat, to individual rights that the state must
be limited to one bite at the prosecutorial apple lest the individual, innocent
in the eyes of the law, be exposed to the possibility of oppressive repeated
prosecutions for the same offense. 3
The relative simplicity of the concept, however, belies the complexity as-
sociated with its application in clay-to-day criminal prosecutions. In reality,
defendants often are discharged from prosecution following judgments that
resemble in effect but not in timing or legal significance the post-trial verdict
of innocence one commonly associates with the term "acquittal."' As a result,
the availability of a post-acquittal double jeopardy defense has come to turn
on subtle and often confusing distinctions in the manner in which the initial
' See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
There are several different facets to the double jeopardy clause. At one time the
Supreme Court observed that it offers three related protections: "It protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1968).. In fact, the number of different protections is greater than three. The clause
also protects under certain circumstances against. reprosecution following mistrial, see
generally Note, Mistrials and Double Jeopardy, 15 Am. Glum. L. REv. 169 (1977); it offers
a certain amount of protection against prosecution for multiple offenses arising out of
the same transaction, see generally Note, Multiple Prosecutions Arising From the Same
Transaction, 15 Am. GRIM. L. REV. 259 (1978); and it lends constitutional status to the
doctrine of collateral estoppel in criminal cases, see generally Note, Expanding Double
Jeopardy: Collateral Estoppel and the Evidentiary Use of Prior Crimes of Which the Defendant
Has Been Acquitted, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 511 (1 974).
2
 The fifth amendment provides in part: "nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977),
where the Court stated: "lilt the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the
sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second trial for the same offense would arm
Government with a potential instrument of oppression."
4
 For example, a defendant might be discharged by the trial court in re-
sponse to a mid-trial defense motion alleging the statute in question to be unconstitu-
tional. The immediate effect of the judgment would be to release the defendant from
prosecution in the same practical manner as a jury verdict of innocence. The timing of
the judgment, however, is obviously different from that of a jury verdict, and the legal
significance of a determination that a statute cannot constitutionally be applied is very
different from that of a factual finding that the acts or conduct alleged have not oc-
curred.
925
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prosecution was terminated. Consider the following: A trial judge may dis-
charge a criminal defendant by way of a pre-, mid-, or post-trial judgment,
irrespective of the decision or the potential decision of the trier of fact. Such
judgment might be characterized either as an acquittal or a dismissal.' In
addition, and perhaps most significantly, such judgment might be granted on
one or several of many substantive grounds. Keeping in mind that protection
against double jeopardy represents an absolute bar to reprosecution of an
individual who may have committed a serious offense, should these pro-
cedural and substantive variations in criminal discharges influence the avail-
ability of a post-discharge double jeopardy defense? And if there should be an
influence, what should that influence be?
Answers to these questions may be found through a growing list of
United States Supreme Court cases. In particular, two cases decided on the
same day during the Supreme Court's 1977-78 term add significantly to the
law of post-acquittal double jeopardy. In United States v. Scott,' the Supreme
Court discarded precedent and confined the availability of a double jeopardy
defense following dismissal to cases where the dismissal represents a finding
of factual innocence, and not merely a favorable resolution of a legal defense
to prosecution.' In Burks v. United States," the Court. again overruled prece-
dent, this time to extend protection against reprosecution to defendants
whose convictions arc overturned on appeal on grounds of evidentiary insuf-
ficiency.`'' Together. these decisions offer a sorely needed definition of the
term "acquittal," a term often misunderstood, and, heretofore, effectively un-
defined for double jeopardy purposes. The definition should reduce the con-
fusion in this area of criminal law.
This note will examine and explain the availability of a federal,'" post-
acquittal double jeopardy defense as modified by these decisions. The note
As with most questions in double jeopardy, even the distinction between
acquittals and dismissals is hazy. Trial court acquittals are factual determinations that
the prosecution's evidence is insufficient. as a matter of law to convict. FED. R. CRIM. P.
29(a), quoted in part at note 35 infra. Dismissals, by contrast, may he granted for
numerous legal and factual reasons, ranging from unconstitutionality of the under-
lying statute, to g(wernmenl misbehavior. to the trial court's approval of an affirma-
tive defense that implies actual innocence. Compare, e.g., United States v. Zisblatt, 172
F.2d 740, 741 (2d Cir. 1949) (dismissal based on statute of limitations defense), will/
United States v. Hill. 473 F.2d 759, 760 (9th Cir. 1972) (dismissal on grounds litera-
ture not obscene as a matter of law). There is no realistic way to explain the term
"dismissal" via a single definition, Rather, dismissals must be viewed as a tool used by
trial courts to supervise and administer criminal prosecutions: they may address sub-
stantive or procedural issues or both, Unfortunately there is no centralized treatment
of dismissals in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, although certain dismissals '
for specific reasons are discussed or generally alluded to. See FED. R. Clam. P. 48, 12.
6(b)(2).
" 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
M. at 97-99, 101. This distinction between innocence and legal immunity is
developed in text and notes at notes 71-84 infra.
437 U.S. 1 (1978).
Id. at 16 - 18.
'° This note examines double jeopardy protection as applied against the fed-
eral government rather than as against the states. Nevertheless, recent cases incorporate




begins by outlining the circumstances under which a criminal defendant who
has been favorably discharged may use the discharge to bar government ap-
peals" and possible reprosecution. Next, the note will review the recent deci-
sions individually in an effort to highlight the most significant facets of each
and to make note of their support of or departure from precedent. Finally,
the note will attempt to develop the theme common to these latest decisions,
to compare this theme with the theoretical pronouncements of earlier deci-
sions, and to assess the apparent shift in judicial orientation. Because the re-
cent decisions represent a rational approach to the realities of criminal pros-
ecutions, this note offers a favorable assessment of these cases."
1. FINAL JUDGMENTS THAT INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
There are three sources of determinations that lead to favorable final
discharges of criminal defendants. These sources are: (1) the trier of fact,
whether judge or jury, which makes solely factual determinations; (2) the trial
court, represented by the trial judge sitting other than as the trier of fact,
which makes legal determinations that may or may not involve serious factual
inquiry; 13 and (3) an appellate court which makes determinations parallel to
those of the trial court. The application of double jeopardy protection to final
judgments differs depending upon the source of such judgments. These
sources, therefore, are treated separately in the following discussion.
A. Acquittal by Decision of the Trier of Fact
The foremost example of post-acquittal double jeopardy protection oc-
curs where a defendant is acquitted by decision of the trier of fact, and it is in
this context that all double jeopardy protection has its beginnings. in such
cases, the acquittal may never be reviewed "on error or otherwise." 14 The
ment due process, thereby making the rules stated herein applicable as against the
states. See, e.g., Crist. v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32, 37-38 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437
U.S. 19, 24 (1978); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969) (overruling Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
" An appellate court is without jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the ap-
peal would violate the double jeopardy clause. Sec text and authorities cited at note 20
infra.
11 A caveat about the scope of this note should he stated. The note discusses
double jeopardy following final judgments favorable to the accused. Non-final judg-
ments such as mistrial declarations are not directly covered, nor are other aspects of
double jeopardy protection such as limitations placed upon the number of separate
offenses chargeable to a single wrongful act. As to these double jeopardy mailers and
others, see Annot., Supreme Court's Views of Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause Per-
tinent to or Applied in Federal Criminal Cases, 50 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1977); l B MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 11 0.418[2) (1974 & Stipp. 1978-79). See also authorities cited in notel supra.
'' A determination of the first sort occurs where the trial court assesses the
legal sufficiency of the evidence against the accused; an example of the second type of
determination occurs when the court passes on the merits of a claimed violation of clue
process.
" United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (discussed at note 15 infra).
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leading case in this area is United States v. Ball." The position taken in Ball is
unequivocal; where a defendant is acquitted by jury verdict, the government
may not appeal the verdict and may not reprosecute the defendant for the
same offense." This rule permits no exception."
The holding in Ball has been extended as a matter of course to bench
trials where a judge replaces the jury as sole trier of fact." An acquittal by
the trial judge in his capacity as the trier of fact is not appealable, and, a
fortiori, will bar reprosecution." Naturally, a defendant's interest in preserv-
ing an acquittal would not vary depending on the character of the trier of fact
he has chosen. It is accepted doctrine, then, that all findings of innocence by
the ultimate trier of fact are accorded absolute finality.
B. Acquittal by Decision of the Trial Court
In contrast to a discharge by decision of the trier of fact, a discharge by
the trial court without benefit of a fact-finder's verdict will not necessarily
foreclose government attempts to appeal the discharge 2 ° and, pending the
" 163 U.S. 662 (1896). In Ball, three defendants had been charged with mur-
der. At their first trial, two defendants were found guilty by a jury and the third was
acquitted. The two convicted defendants successfully appealed their convictions. All
three defendants were then re-indicted and convicted. Id. at 663-64. The defendant
who had been acquitted at the earlier trial appealed on grounds of double jeopardy.
In upholding his claim, the Supreme Court stated:
As to the defendant who had been acquitted by the verdict duly re-
turned and received, the court could take no other action than to order his
discharge.... [fin this country a verdict of acquittal, although not followed





 There is no exception, for example, where the acquittal is implied. See
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184. 190-91 (1957). In Green the defendant was
charged with first degree murder. The judge instructed the jury that it could find the
defendant. guilty of either first or second degree murder, and the jury convicted the
defendant of the lesser offense. This conviction was overturned on appeal and the
defendant was awarded a new trial. At the second trial the defendant was again
charged with first degree murder and this time was convicted of the greater offense.
Id. at 190. The defendant objected to the first degree charge on grounds of double
jeopardy, and the Supreme Court upheld this claim. Id. Although the first jury had
not returned an express verdict of acquittal as to the first degree charge, the Supreme
Court held, as one basis for reversal, that the jury's conviction of the lesser offense
amounted to an implicit acquittal of the greater charge. Adhering to the premise that
verdicts of acquittal are final, the Court concluded that the implicit acquittal absolutely
barred a second trial for first degree murder, thus giving effect to the implicit acquit-
tal as if it has been an express verdict. Id. at 190-91.
'" See United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1, 3 (1976). In Morrison, the Court
stated: "[slince the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment nowhere dis-
tinguishes between bench and jury trials, the principles given expression through that
Clause apply to cases tried to a judge." Id. (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S.
358, 365 (1975)). See also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 573
n.12 (1977).
'" 429 U.S. at 3.
2" The federal government's authority to appeal adverse rulings in criminal
cases is entirely statutory. See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892). In
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outcome of the appeal, to reprosecute. In these cases, the appealability of a
defendant's discharge and the possibility of reprosecution depend on two fac-
tors: (1) the procedural timing of the discharge, and (2) the substantive reason
for the discharge.
1. Procedural Timing: Pre-Trial and Post-Conviction Discharges.
The procedural timing of trial court discharges is a threshhold determin-
ant of the availability of a post-discharge double jeopardy defense. Where a
defendant is discharged before trial, neither appeal of the discharge nor re-
newed. prosecution in the event that the appeal is successful will violate the
double jeopardy clause. 2 ' And where the defendant is discharged in a post-
verdict judgment despite having been convicted by the trier of fact., a gov-
ernment appeal seeking reinstatement of the guilty verdict will be permitted. 22
Pre-trial discharge poses no barrier to appeal and reprosecution under
the rationale that such a defendant has never suffered first jeopardy. The
leading case in this area is Serfass v. United States." In Serfass the Supreme
Court held that a pre-trial dismissal occurs prior to the time when first
jeopardy attaches, 24
 and that a defendant who has not yet been put in
1971, Congress amended the previous Criminal Appeals Act, 18 . U.S.C. § 3731 (1964),
to make the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy the sole limit on gov-
ernment appeals in criminal cases. Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
9l-644, Title III, 84 Stat.. 1890. The present version of the Criminal Appeals Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3731 (1976), now provides in part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of
appeals from a decision, judgment or order of a district court dismissing
an indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no
appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States
Constitution prohibits Further prosecution.
In one of the first cases construing the amended Act, the Supreme Court concluded
that, "Congress intended to remove all statutory harriers to Government appeals and
to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit." United States v. Wilson,
420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975).
21 See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1975). See generally Note,
Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals.
 in Criminal Cases, 12 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PRoti.
295. 319 (1976).
22 See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975). See generally Note,
Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12 CoLum.J.L. & Soc. PRoB.
295, 300 (1976).
23 420 U.S. 377 (1975). In Serfass, the defendant had been indicted for draft_
evasion. The indictment was dismissed upon the defendant's pre-trial motion claiming
that he had been denied full consideration of his conscientious objector status. Id. at
380-81. The government appealed this dismissal, and the defendant opposed the ap-
peal on grounds of double jeopardy. The court of appeals rejected this claim, United
States v. Serfass, 492 F.2d 388, 39! (3d Cir. 1974), and the Supreme Court affirmed,
saying that "an accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy."
420 U.S. at 393. The Court held that "[w]ithout risk of a determination of guilt,
jeopardy does not attach, and neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes
double jeopardy." Id. at 391-92.
24
 Attachment of jeopardy is a mechanical concept that provides a uniform
rule for determining the point at which the defendant's double jeopardy rights will he
recognized. In a jury trial, jeopardy is said to attach when a jury is impaneled and
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. jeopardy is not, therefore, exposed I.() second jeopardy if the government ap-
peals and later resumes prosecution.' The pre-trial rule serves the impor-
tant function of facilitating an early, favorable resolution of affirmative de-
fenses, motions to suppress and the like, while preserving an opportunity for
the government to appeal. Although it is not entirely clear from the case law,
the non-barring effect of pre-trial discharges appears to apply without regard
to the grounds for the discharge.'"
sworn. See Grist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1978): Downum v. United States, 372
U.S. 734, 735-38 (1963). In a bench trial, attachment occurs when the judge begins to
hear the evidence. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569
( I 977); McCarthy v. Zerbst. 85 F.2c1 640, 642 (10th Cir. 1936). The premise of these
rules is that "the 'constitutional policies underpinning the Fifth Amendment's guaran-
tee' are not implicated before that point in the proceedings at which 'jeopardy at-
taches: - Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. at 390-91 (quot.ing United States v. jorn,
400 U.S. 470. 480 (1971)).
25
 420 U.S. 390-91.
2" See id. Presumably, the grounds for discharge are irrelevant if indeed first
jeopardy has never occurred.
A complete understanding of why the reason for discharge is a relevant con-
sideration requires familiarity with the Supreme Court's recent decisions in United
States v. Scott. and Burks v. United States, discussed infra. These cases draw a distinc-
tion between factual and legal grounds for discharge, granting double jeopardy protec-
tion in the former context and withholding it in the latter. If the rationale of the
recent cases is applicable in the pre-trial area (which it has every reason to be). then
the Serfass pre-trial rule is not as notable as it used to be, since only factual discharges
can invoke double jeopardy protection, and factual discharges ordinarily do not occur
before trial. Such factual discharges usually await the formal presentation of at least
some evidence at trial. Nevertheless, it is still conceivable that a pre-trial acquittal or
factual dismissal may occur. See, e.g., United States v. Pecora. 484 F.2d 1289, 1292-93
(3d Cir. 1973) (facts stipulated prior to trial—appeal allowed—court held jeopardy
had not attached); United States v. Lasater, 535 F.2d 1041, 1047 (8th Cir. 1976) (pre-
trial acquittal after pre-trial hearing—acquittal treated as dismissal—appeal
allowed—court held jeopardy had not attached because case was to he tried to jury).
See also United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14, 16 (1976) (per curiatn). In Sanford,
defendants were indicted for illegal game hunting. The district court agreed with the
defendant's pre-trial motion alleging that the government had consented to the
claimed illegal activity, and hence dismissed the charge. The Supreme Court found the
dismissal to be appealable under Serfass, without discussing and despite the fact that
the dismissal appears to have been addressed essentially to factual matters. Id.
There are other cases in which a pre-trial acquittal or factual dismissal has occurred
and in which government appeals and reprosecution have been barred on double
jeopardy grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 532 F.2c1 142, 145-46 (9th Cir.
1976) (facts stipulated prior to trial—appeal barred—court found jeopardy had at-
tached): United States v. Hill, 473 F.2d 759, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1972) (pre-trial hearing
on general issue in case—appeal barred—decided prior to Serfass). In particular, ,nee
Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676 (1973) (per curiam). In Finch the Supreme Court
denied a government appeal from a dismissal of a case submitted on an agreed state-
ment of facts. The Court apparently accepted the finding of the court of appeals that
jeopardy had attached, although this issue was not directly presented. The actual deci-
sion was based on the fact that other case law had been misapplied. Id. at 677. As
pointed out by Justice Rehnquist. in his dissent, the Supreme Court had never decided
when jeopardy attaches in a case of this type. Id. at 681. Despite Finch, this question
still does not appear to have been decided directly by the Supreme Court. The central
issue in determining whether double jeopardy protection should attach to pre-trial
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A defendant also may be discharged by the trial judge after a conviction
by the trier of fact (the criminal equivalent of a civil judgment non obstante
verdicto). 27 Because a successful government appeal of this post-conviction
judgment would be followed by reinstatement of the guilty verdict without
threat of actual reprosecution, an appeal in this context does not constitute
second jeopardy. The leading case taking this position is United States v. Wil-
son." In Wilson the Supreme Court held that while the double jeopardy
clause forbids reprosecution after trial terminations favorable to the defend-
ant, it does not preclude government appeals per se where a successful ap-
peal would not result in reprosecution." Hence, provided the guilty verdict
may be reinstated," the government is permitted to challenge the legal basis
factual discharges, as distinguished from pre-trial legal discharges, appears to be
whether a defendant actually is exposed to jeopardy due to pre-trial consideration of
facts, or whether, instead, only an actual trial constitutes jeopardy. The recent cases,
discussed infra, are at least relevant to this inquiry clue to the distinction they draw
between factual and legal matters. For a discussion of whether double jeopardy protec-
tion should extend to pre-trial factual discharges, see generally Comment, Double
Jeopardy and Government Appeals of Criminal Dismissals, 52 TEX. L.R. 303, 337-38 (1974).
27 See FED. R. GRIM. P. 29(c). A post-verdict acquittal might even occur in a
bench trial where the judge renders both the guilty verdict and the post-verdict acquit-
tal. See, e.g., United Stales v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 271 (1978).
28 420 U.S. 332 (1975). In Wilson, the defendant was charged with unlawful
conversion of union funds. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, but the trial judge
granted the defendant's post-verdict motion to dismiss on grounds of pre-indictment
delay. Id. at 334-35. The government appealed the dismissal and the court of appeals,
treating the trial judge's dismissal as an unreviewable acquittal, held that the double
jeopardy clause foreclosed review. 492 F.2d 1345, 1348 (3d Cir. 1973). The Supreme
Court, making no distinction between dismissals and acquittals, reversed the court of
appeals and authorized the government's appeal. 420 U.S. at 353. The Court stated:
"The development of the Double Jeopardy Clause from its cornmon-law origins thus
suggests that it was directed at the threat of multiple prosecutions, not at Government
appeals, at least where those appeals would not, require a new trial." Id. at 342. Nor-
mally, a new trial is not required for reinstatement. of the guilty verdict. The Court
went. on to say that "a defendant has no legitimate claim to benefit from an error of
law when that error could be corrected without subjecting him to a second trial before
a second trier of fact." Id. at 345. This language does not mean I hat all government
appeals will be permitted by the double jeopardy clause. To the contrary, the clause
continues to offer significant ancillary protection against government appeals. It does
so. however, with a view toward the consequences of the appeal, rather than toward
the appeal itself. Where the inevitable result of a successful government appeal would
be a second trial that would be barred by the double jeopardy clause, the appeal—a
meaningless exercise under these circumstances—is barred as well. By definition, how-
ever, a government appeal is not a separate prosecution and does not by itself consti-
tute second jeopardy.
29 420 U.S. at 352-53.
3° The verdict might not be able to he reinstated if, for example, after the
post-conviction acquittal, the defendant were to succeed in having the original convic-
tion declared invalid due to trial error. For a case foreshadowing this question, see
United States v. Rojas, 554 F.2d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1978), and supplemental order at
574 F.2d 476 (1978) (defendant authorized to raise new-trial motions following a
post-conviction discharge that was reversed on appeal). In United States v. Donahue.
539 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1976), the court pointed out:
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of a post-conviction discharge before an appellate court. Post-conviction
judgments are useful as a tool which permits trial courts to resolve complex
legal questions in the defendant's favor (thus shifting the initial burden of
appeal to the government), without foreclosing appellate review of these rul-
ings. As appears to be the case concerning pre-trial discharges, the post-
conviction rule applies without regard to the grounds for the discharge.'
2. Reason for Discharge: The Requirement of an Acquittal.
Criminal defendants may be favorably discharged for a variety of sub-
stantive reasons, ranging from procedural irregularity to the trial judge's be-
lief that the defendant is innocent as a matter of law. Where the timing of the
It does not necessarily follow from the fact that a verdict of guilty errone-
ously set aside is reinstated that a defendant's conviction is validated. He
may still move for a new trial or he may appeal from an ultimate judgment
of conviction on the basis of errors occurring in the course of the trial.
Id. at 1134.
"I See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1978); United
States v. Blasco, 581 F.2d 681, 683 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1978). The reason for the judgment
however, would become important if the guilty verdict were somehow unable to be
reinstated. See note 30 supra. In that event, a post-conviction discharge granted by
reason of a purely legal defense would not bar a new trial, while a post-conviction
discharge on factual grounds arguably would. An understanding of this problem re-
quires a familiarity with the recent Supreme Court cases, United States v. Scott and
Burks v. United States, discussed infra. The rationale of these decisions withholds im-
mediate double jeopardy protection from discharges pursuant to purely legal defenses,
but grants this protection to factual discharges. Thus. if a purely legal post-conviction
discharge were overturned on appeal and if the conviction could not be reinstated, a
second trial would nevertheless be permissible since factual issues were never resolved
in the defendant's favor. Conversely, if a factual post-conviction discharge were over-
turned on appeal and if the conviction could not be reinstated, a second trial would
arguably be prohibited since the discharge was based on factual matters within the
protective scope of the double jeopardy clause. In either case, a second trial would be
desirable in order to correct the trial error that prevents reinstatement of the con-
viction: nevertheless, adherence to the fact/law distinction in the recent cases would
prevent reprosecution in the circumstance of a factual discharge. If the trial error thus
could not be corrected, the defendant would have to be released from prosecution.
Whether this result is necessary is problematic. Language in Wilson suggests that a
defendant may never be reprosecuted after a post-conviction acquittal, even though a
government appeal will lie. Since trial error can only be corrected by a second trial,
Wilson would technically prohibit a second trial for this purpose. The defendant
would, in effect, be finally discharged merely because of trial error, coupled with the
fortuity of the erroneous post-conviction acquittal. Normally, by contrast, new trials are
permitted following reversal for trial error. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15
(1978): United States v. Tateo, 337 U.S. 463, 466 (1964). One hesitates to insulate
defendants from otherwise permissible second trials merely because an erroneous
post-conviction judgment happened to be granted. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court is clearly willing to give effect to even egregiously erroneous acquittals when
necessary to protect legitimate double jeopardy rights. See Sanabria v. United States,
437 U.S. 54, 75 (1978). The question is whether legitimate double jeopardy rights are
implicated in the case posed where the defendant has already been convicted by the
trier of fact, but where the conviction cannot be reinstated due merely to trial error.
Such facts present a complex conceptual issue that may eventually face the Supreme
Court.
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discharge does not establish the government's right to appeal—when the dis-
charge occurs after jeopardy has attached but before the case has been de-
cided by the trier of fact—the inquiry determining the availability of a double
jeopardy defense shifts to an assessment of the substantive reason for dis-
charge. In broad terms, the discharge must represent a judgment as to the
defendant's factual innocence, rather than legal immunity, before double
jeopardy protection will be invoked. 32 The distinction between innocence
and immunity to some extent parallels the distinction between trial court ac-
quittals and dismissals." The parallels are not perfect, however, because the
label used by the trial court may not necessarily describe accurately the judg-
ment in question, and because certain dismissals may involve factual determi-
nations tantamount to acquittal. In this regard, when necessary, a reviewing
court will look beyond the label to the substance of a given defendant's dis-
charge to establish the true character of the judgment. 34
The standard to be applied in the case of a correctly labelled trial court
acquittal—a judgment that does invoke double jeopardy—appears in Rule 29
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 29 expressly provides for
trial court acquittal as a matter of law, either before or after jury verdict,
where the prosecution has failed to satisfy its burden of proof." In Sanabria
v. United States, 36 now the leading case on the issue of bona fide acquittals, the
32 See text and notes at notes 71-84 infra.
33 For a discussion of the distinction between trial court acquittal and trial
court dismissal, see note 5 supra.
34 See, e.g., United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 909 (1976), rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 945 (1976). In United States v.
Joni, 400 U.S. 470, 478 n.7 (1970), the plurality opinion noted: "["The trial judge's
characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the action for the
purposes of our appellate jurisdiction." In Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. at 392
(1975), the Court said: The word [acquittal] itself has no talismanic quality for the
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause." For an example of judicial mislabelling, if
not misbehavior, see United States v. Appawoo, 553 F.2d 1242, 1244-47 (10th Cir.
1977) (judge deliberately attempted to foreclose government appeal).
35
 FED. R. CHM. P. 29(a) provides in part:
Motions for directed verdict are abolished and motions for judgment
of acquittal shall be used in their place. The court on motion of a defend-
ant or of its own motion shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal
of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or information after the
evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction of such offense or offenses.
See generally 2 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 462
(1969).
It should be noted that the trial court is not permitted to bypass the jury in a
criminal case in order to enter a judgment of conviction. This is so no matter how
overwhelming the evidence. Obvious jury trial rights would otherwise be infringed. See
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977); United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408
(1947); Span and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105 (1895).
36 437 U.S. 54 (1978). In Sanabria, the trial judge acquitted the defendant
after jeopardy had attached, but before verdict. The judge based his judgment on a
clearly erroneous interpretation of the statute in question and on the insufficiency of
evidence created by his erroneous exclusion of certain prosecution evidence. Id. at 59,
68. The government appealed claiming that the judgment of acquittal, while unre-
viewable as to one basis of liability, was reviewable as to a second, discrete basis of
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Supreme Court held that when a trial court enters a judgment of acquittal as
a matter of law after trial has commenced but before a verdict has been re-
ceived, both appellate review and any prospect of further prosecution are ab-
solutely barred. 37 Such judgment will have this barring effect even if it is
egregiously erroneous under the circumstances.' Therefore, when a trial
court enters a mid-trial" judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29, and
where the discharge actually represents a judgment on the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence as required by Rule 29, such judgment may not be
reviewed on appeal, and obviously no further prosecution can occur.
Unlike the barring effect of bona fide judgments of acquittal, the role for
double jeopardy purposes of mid-trial judgments of dismissal has not always
been clear.`") Part of the ambiguity in the area of dismissals arises from the
fact that there is no comprehensive statutory standard for dismissal as exists
in the case of a Rule 29 acquittal. Dismissals can be granted for a host of
reasons, and serve primarily as a tool for the exercise of trial court discre-
tion." Prior to United Stales v. Scott 42 (one of the recent cases forming the
basis of this note), all mid-trial judgments of dismissal had been held to bar
liability. The court of appeals agreed and remanded the case for a new trial of the
claimed reviewable charge. United States v. Sanabria, 548 F.2c1 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1976).
'the Supreme Court reversed. After rejecting the theory that the single-count indict-
ment contained two discrete bases of' liability. the Court stated firmly that "there is no
exception permitting retrial once the defendant has been acquitted, no flatter' how
`egregiously erroneous' ... the legal rulings leading to that judgment might be." 437
U.S. at 75 (citations omitted).
37 437 U.S. at 77-78. See also Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133-34
(1904).
"" 437 U.S. at 75, glinted a! note 36 supra. See also United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977): Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141,
143 (1962) (per curiam).
"" The term "mid-trial" as used herein is shorthand for judgments that occur
after jeopardy has attached, but before a final determination by the trier of fact has
been received. in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), the
jury had been discharged clue to its failure to reach a verdict; then, sometime thereaf-
ter, the trial judge ordered an acquittal. Id. at 566. Despite the fact that the acquittal in
Marlin Linen technically did not occur during trial, it would nevertheless be considered
"mid-trial" herein, S11/02. 110 verdict had been rendered by the trier of fact at the time
the acquittal was granted.
See Note. Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12 CoLum.
& Soc. Picots. 295, 296-99 (1976).
At one time, government appeals front criminal dismissals were limited by statute,
and not merely by constitutional double jeopardy as is now the case. See note 20 supra.
Cases decided prior to 1971, under the previous version of' the Criminal Appeals Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964), offer little insight into constitutional double jeopardy, since
review of dismissals was ()lien completely barred by that statute. See, e.g., United States
v. Heath, 260 F.2d 623, 626-28 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Nardolillo, 252 F.2d
755, 757-58 (1st Cir. 1958). Furthermore, such cases arc of little aid in understanding
the double ,jeopardy clause, since they were usually confined to interpreting the crimi-
nal appeals statute. rather than the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
See, e.g., United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 270-80 (1970); United States v. Mersky,
361 U.S. 431, 434-38 (1960).
4 ' See note 5 supra.
42
 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (discussed at notes 51-100 infra).
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government appeals and reprosecution without regard to the underlying
reason for the dismissal." This unqualified rule was, however, discarded in
Scott," and now double jeopardy following dismissal depends on subtle dis-
tinctions in the reason for the judgment. The new approach to dismissals is
developed in this note in the upcoming discussion of the Scott case.
C. Acquittal by Decision if an Appellate Court
The standard for double jeopardy following appellate court judgments
favorable to the accused was markedly changed by the other case forming the
basis of this note, Burks v. United States. 45 Prior to Burks, appellate courts
were free to order whatever proceedings justice seemed to require when re-
versing a defendant's conviction.'" Even a finding by an appellate court that
the prosecution had failed as a matter of law to meet its burden of proof
would not have prevented a second trial. After Burks, by contrast, certain "ap-
pellate acquittals" will invoke double jeopardy protection. Because Burks is the
watershed case in this area, and thus discussion here of the relevant, principles
would be repetitious with this note's later discussion of Burks, development of
these issues will be deferred until the discussion of Burks. For the sake of
organization, however, it is important at this point to appreciate that. appellate
courts represent an independent source of double jeopardy-invoking dis-
charges.
II. THE RECENT CASES
In recent years the Supreme Court has made repeated efforts to spell out
the scope of the protection the double jeopardy clause provides.'" These
efforts continued in the Supreme Court's 1977-78 term, in which the Court
decided a total of eight cases involving double jeopardy. 48
 Two of these latest
cases, United States v. Scott 4`' and Burks v. United States,' represent notable
43 See United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975).
44
 437 U.S. at 86-87.
" 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
4 " See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298. 327-28 (1957); Bryan v. United
States, 338 U.S. 552, 560 (1950).
47 See, e.g., Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676 (1977); Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161 (1977); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977); Lee v. United States,
432 U.S. 23 (1977); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977);
United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1 (1976); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377
(1975); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975); United States v. Wilson. 420
U.S. 332 (1975).
48
 In addition to Scott and Burks, the Court decided the following double
jeopardy cases: Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978) (ro-tier juvenile procedure
constitutes single proceeding); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978) (discussed
at note 36 supra); Grist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (state rule governing attachment of
jeopardy same as federal rule); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978) (Burks appellate
acquittal rule applied to states); United States v. Wheeler. 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (United
States and Navajo Tribe are separate sovereigns for purposes of separate prosecu-
tions): Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (sufficient finding of "manifest
necessity" was made in declaring mistrial).
4" 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
5" 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
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departures from recent and not so recent precedent in the area of post-
acquittal double jeopardy protection.
A. United States v. Scott: Factual Versus Legal Dismissals
In Scott the Supreme Court authorized the government to appeal from a
mid-trial dismissal of charges entered by the trial court in response to the
defendant's motion alleging unfair pre-indictment delay." Before Scott was
decided, mid-trial dismissal of charges on the basis of any affirmative defense
to prosecution would have been final and unreviewable. 52
The prior rule was established in United States v. fenkins 53 where the Su-
preme Court decided that any mid-trial discharge of a defendant would bar
further proceedings if a resolution of factual issues would be required on
reversal and remand.54 As a result, review of mid-trial dismissals would be
virtually impossible since almost all such dismissals require further fact-
finding on remand. In Scott, the Supreme Court rejected this broad prohibi-
tion. 55
437 U.S. at 95, 101.
52 See United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358. 370 (1975). What seemed to be,
but actually was not, an exception to the Jenkins rule occurred in Lee v. United States,
432 U.S. 23 (1977). In that case, a mid-trial dismissal on the basis of a technical flaw in
the indictment was held not to bar appeal and reprosecution. Id. at 34. This technical
objection to the indictment falls short of constituting the affirmative defense meant in
the text. In Lee, the defendant moved before trial to dismiss the indictment on
grounds that it failed to allege all of the required elements of the offense. Ruling on
the motion was deferred, and, after hearing the evidence, the judge dismissed the
indictment due to its technical flaw. The defendant subsequently was charged with and
convicted of the same offense upon a proper indictment, and he appealed. Id. at
24-27. The court of appeals rejected the defendant's claim of double jeopardy. United
States v. Lee, 539 F.2d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). The Supreme Court
affirmed. It reasoned that, under the particular circumstances in Lee, the proceedings
could not be said to have terminated in the defendant's favor. Instead, the Court
concluded, the dismissal was "functionally indistinguishable from a declaration of mis-
trial." 432 U.S. at 31. Applying the general rule that mistrials do not bar reprosecution,
see text and note at note 140 infra, the Court concluded that reprosecution was
proper. 432 U.S. at 34.
" 420 U.S. 358 (1975). Defendant Jenkins had been charged with draft eva-
sion. After a bench trial, but before a general finding of guilt or innocence, the trial
judge dismissed the indictment on the grounds that the defendant's claimed con-
scientious objector status had not been given proper consideration under the law
applicable at that time. Id. at 359-62. The government appealed, but the appeals court
viewed the trial court's dismissal as an unappealable acquittal. It therefore dismissed
the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 490 F.2d 868, 880 (2d Cir. 1973). The Supreme
Court affirmed. The Court's broad language suggested that a mid-trial discharge of a
defendant, whether in the form of an acquittal or a dismissal, bars government appeal
and reprosecution as long as "further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolu-
tion of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged, would [he] required
upon reversal and remand." 420 U.S. at 370.
54
 420 U.S. at 370.
55







The defendant in Scott was charged with three counts of distribution of
narcotics. He moved prior to trial for a judgment of dismissal on grounds that
his defense had been prejudiced by pre-indictment delay." The trial judge
denied the motion, but after hearing all the evidence and before submitting
the case to the jury, the judge granted the defendant's renewed motion to
dismiss the first two counts of indictment. 57 Thereafter the jury returned a
verdict of not guilty as to the . third count. The government appealed from the
two trial court. dismissals, but the court of appeals, relying in part on Jenkins,
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction!'" The Supreme Court granted
review to consider the applicability of the double jeopardy clause to govern-
ment appeals From orders granting defense motions to terminate trial before
a verdict is rendered. 5 "
The Supreme Court held in favor of the government, reversed the court
of appeals, and remanded the case to that court for consideration of the
merits of the government's appeal." After noting that the government was
quite willing . ' to submit its proof to the jury, the Scott Court said:
This is scarcely a picture of an all-powerful state relentlessly pursu-
ing a defendant who had either been found not guilty or who had at
least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier
of fact. It is instead a picture of a defendant who chooses to avoid
conviction and imprisonment, not because of his assertion that the
Government has failed to make out a case against him, but because
of a legal claim that the Government's case against him must fail
even though it might satisfy the trier of fact that he was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Thus, believing that the mid-trial motion had deprived the government of its
entitled opportunity to take its proof to the jury," 2 the Court concluded that
the defendant. should not. be relieved of the possibility of a second trial."
Both the Scott Court's language and the posture of the case leave no
doubt as to the Court's rejection of Jenkins. If prosecution were to resume in
Scott, further fact-finding would be necessary in order to present evidence
before a second trier of fact; thus even the loosest reading of Jenkins would
require dismissal of the government's appeal."' The Scott Court disapproved
of this result, and concluded that Jenkins was wrongly decided."' The Court
Id. at 84.
57 Id.
58 544 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
59 437 U.S. at 84.
"" Id. at 101. The court of appeals held against the government on remand.
579 F.2d 1013, 1014 (6th Cir. 1978).
" 1 437 U.S. at 96.
"2 Id. at 98-99.
" 3 hi. at 100 (citing Arizona v. Washington. 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).
" 4
 437 U.S. at 95.
"5 Id. at 86-87.
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determined that Jenkins placed too great an emphasis on the defendant's right
to have his guilt decided by the first jury impaneled to try him, and thereby
improperly included in the double jeopardy prohibition cases in which the
defendant himself seeks to terminate the trial before verdict on grounds unre-
lated to factual guilt or innocence."
The Scott opinion attaches binding importance to the defendant's volun-
tarily choosing to seek a mid-trial dismissal for allegedly prejudicial delay. The
defendant originally raised this claim in a pre-trial motion to dismiss." After
the pre-trial motion had been denied without prejudice," the defendant's al-
ternatives were to renew the motion alter the evidence but before verdict (as
he did), or to await verdict and, in the event he was found guilty, to enter a
post-verdict motion for dismissal.• It is obvious that this latter choice would
run counter to the instincts of most defendants, particularly those who believe
they are likely to be found guilty. Nevertheless, because the defendant in Scott
rejected this latter choice out of hand, and thereby terminated the trial prior
to a finding of factual guilt or innocence, the Court in effect charged the
defendant with strict responsibility for the possibility of his reprosecution. 7 °
Accordingly, under the rule in Scott, defendants who follow instinct or
"" Id. at 87.
" Raising this defense in a pre-trial motion was the proper course to be fol-
lowed. In Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975), the Court. left open the ques-
tion whether a defendant who is afforded an opportunity to obtain a determination of
a legal defense prior to trial. but who knowingly allows himself to be placed in
jeopardy. later may be denied a double jeopardy defense. Id. at 394. The pre-trial
motion in Scott was, therefore, advisable in order for the defendant to preserve this
defense. For a case where a double jeopardy defense was denied on these grounds, see
United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 86 (51h Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 909
(1976), rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 945 (1976); for subsequent developments in this case,
see United States v. Kehoe, 573 F.2d 335, 344-45 (5th Cir. 1978) and United States v.
Kehoe, 579 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), first reversing and then affirming
the result, but not necessarily the reasoning, in the first case.
" 8
 Denial without prejudice of the pre-indictment delay claim. coupled with
the trial court's later reconsideration of the motion, permitted the trial court to decide
the motion after an evaluation of the evidence presented at trial through which actual
prejudice could more accurately be detected. See 437 U.S. at 111 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing),
Incidentally, if the government had not been permitted to appeal the adverse
mid-trial ruling, deferral of the pre-trial motion would have violated Rule 12(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the
court, for good cause, orders that it be deferred for determination at the
trial of the general issue or until after verdict, but no such determination shall
be deferred if a party's right to appeal is adversely affected.
(emphasis added). See Brief for Petitioner at 25-26, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82
(1978). Cf. United States v. Fay, 553 F.2d 1247, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 1977) (trial judge
improperly deferred ruling on pre-trial motions to suppress. and then. after jeopardy
had attached, suppressed evidence and acquitted the defendants; the court of appeals
refused to permit the government to appeal, despite the procedural irregularity).
"" The latter is the practice addressed in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332, 352-53 (1975), and discussed in text at notes 27-31 supra.
7 " See 437 U.S. at 96-99.
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strategy and raise purely legal defenses such as pre-indictment delay after
trial has commenced but before verdict must endure the possibility of a sec-
ond trial.
2. The New Definition of Acquittal.
In the process of reaching its decision, the Scott Court endorsed a rela-
tively new" definition of the acquittal required to invoke a double jeopardy
defense. The Court held that a defendant is acquitted for double jeopardy
purposes only where the ruling of the trial judge, whatever its labe1, 72 actually
represents a resolution in the defendant's favor, correct or not, 73 of some or
all of the factual elements of the offense charged.'" This definition of an
acquittal permitted the Court to distinguish between dismissals granted pur-
suant to legal defenses and dismissals granted pursuant to factual defenses.
Under this definition, a factual dismissal would qualify as an acquittal for
double jeopardy purposes, but a legal dismissal would not. As viewed by the
Court, a legal defense, such as that of pre-indictment delay, represents a legal
judgment that a defendant, even if criminally culpable, may not be punished
because of a supposed constitutional violation." The effect of a valid legal
defense, the Court noted, is to terminate the proceedings against the defend-
ant on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. 76 Without a prior
finding of innocence, post-acquittal double jeopardy protection is not in-
voked."
On the other hand, the Scott Court would view a dismissal pursuant to a
factual defense very differently. The Court offered as examples of factual
defenses the defenses of insanity and entrapment, and equated dismissal
based on such defenses with trial court acquittal, at least as far as double
7' The definition is "relatively new" because prior to Scott it had never been
endorsed directly. The "definition" appeared for the first time as general language in
a majority opinion by Justice Brennan in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). Martin Linen, however, also acknowledged the Jenkins ap-
proach prohibiting second trials whenever further fact-finding would be required, id.
at 570, an approach inconsistent with the Scott definition. Thus, it cannot he said that.
the Scott definition enjoyed direct support prior to Scott. In Scott, Justice Brennan dis-
agreed with the majority's use of his earlier language to distinguish between factual
and legal discharges. 437 U.S. at 111-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Another pre-Scott
case examining the meaning of acquittal is United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267,
288-89 and n.19 (1970). in which the concept of acquittal is linked to factual questions,
but in which no general fact/law distinction is developed.
72 Appellate courts will look beyond the trial court's label to dete .rmine the
true character of the judgment in question. See authorities cited at note 34 supra.
73 A true acquittal will bar reprosecution even if' egregiously erroneous. See
text and authorities cited at note 38 supra.
" 437 U.S. at 97-98.
" Id. at 98. For further support of the proposition that pre-indictment delay is
a legal rather than factual defense, see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307. 312
(1971).
437 U.S. at 98-99.
" Id. Note that other facets of general double jeopardy protection may not
require a prior finding of innocence. See discussion at note 1 supra.
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jeopardy is concerned." The Scott opinion explained that when the govern-
ment does not submit enough evidence to rebut the essentially factual defense
of insanity, a failure of proof requiring an acquittal necessarily has taken
place." The Court said that the defense of insanity, like the defense of en-
trapment,'" arises from the notion that Congress could not have intended
punishment for a defendant who, although having committed all the elements
of an offense, is able to establish a legally adequate justification or excuse."
Such a factual finding, the Court reasoned, establishes the defendant's lack of
criminal culpability."
The distinction between factual and legal defenses separates those affir-
mative defenses which determine a defendant's culpabilty from those which
determine whether, even if culpable, the defendant legally may be tried." Its
ultimate effect is to narrow the list of judgments that bar government appeal.
Henceforth, in order to bar appeal the trial court's judgment must be one
that indicates that, the government's factual case has failed either as to the
statutory elements of the offense charged, or as to the burden shifted to the
government when a defendant raises a prima facie defense that, unrebutted,
would justify a finding of innocence."
3. Dissent.
The majority opinion in Scott is accompanied by a strong dissent in which
four justices join. The dissent flatly rejects the majority's definition of acquit-
tal and contends that the majority's distinction between "true acquittals" and
other final judgments favorable to the accused is "insupportable in either logic
or policy."'" The dissent's basic objection to the majority's distinction re-
" 437 U.S. at 07-98.
7 " Id. The Court cited Burks v. United States. 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978), to sup-
port the proposition that an insanity defense relates to factual rather than legal issues.
Scott v. United States, 437 U.S. at 97.
80 Regarding the nature of an entrapment defense, see United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
81 437 U.S. at 97-98.
82 Id. at 98.
83
 In practice, distinctions between legal and factual defenses are probably des-
tined to be made on an ad hoc basis. One factor that may be useful in drawing such
distinctions is whether the defense in question is of the sort ordinarily submitted to the
jury.
" See 437 U.S. at 97-98. The Scott decision rests in part on the finding that the
defendant voluntarily exposed himself to the possibility of a second trial (see text at.
notes 67-70 supra) and in part on the distinction between factual and legal defenses.
One might therefore question whether the fact/law distinction alone would have sup-
ported the result in the eyes of the majority. It is relevant here that Scott is a 5 to 4
decision.
" 437 U.S. at. 103 (Brennan, j., dissenting). On this point it is curious to note
that justice Brennan joined in justice Marshall's opinion for the majority in Sanabria
v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978) (another double jeopardy decision decided at the
same time as Scott), which seems to acknowledge a fact/law distinction:
Unlike questions of whether an indictment states an offense, a statute is
unconstitutional, or conduct set forth in an indictment violates the statute,
what proof may be presented in support of a valid indictment and the
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wolves around its more rigid adherence to the notion that all second trials
infringe the interests sought to be protected by the double jeopardy clause.8"
As seen by the dissent, it. is the retrial itself that threatens constitutionally
protected interests, regardless of the procedural events leading to premature
termination of the first trial." 7
The dissent. also questions the practicality of the majority's distinction be-
tween factual and legal defenses, calling it "purely Formal"" and "incapable
of principled application." 8"
 Lower courts, the dissent. predicts, will have dif-
ficulty applying the distinction in light of the majority's minimal guidance on
the point." The dissent. concludes by suggesting that. in the long run there
will be few defenses which can be deemed unrelated to factual innocence,
and, thus, that the effect of the decision will he limited."' Obviously, the
practical utility of the distinction can be determined only through experience.
4. Assessment.
Athough there may he a tendency on the part of some to see the Scott
decision as part of a contemporary trend to diminish the rights of criminal
defendants, the result should not he seen simply as an attempt to expose de-
fendants to greater burdens. In the final analysis, the merits of the defend-
ant's case, be they factual or legal, will determine whether or not he or she is
punished. This new rationale should instead be viewed as an attempt to re-
allocate the risks of trial court error. The defendant with a valid legal defense
ultimately will receive the benefit of his or her defense. Under the Scott rule,
however, the defendant will be forced to defend before an appellate court the
legal basis of' his or her discharge once it has been approved by the trial court.
The alternative to the new rule is to place absolute responsibility on the pros-
ecution for all mid-trial errors that the trial court may make." This is so
because mid-trial errors otherwise could not he challenged on appeal by the
sufficiency of that proof arc not "legal defenses" required to be or even
capable of being resolved before trial.
437 U.S. al 77.
8 " See 437 U.S. at 104-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As regards the notion that
all second trials, per se, offend the double jeopardy clause, see text accompanying
notes I 31-43 infra.
" 437 U.S. at 104-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"" hi. at 109 (Brennan. J., dissenting).
8 " Id. at 103, t t t (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"" Id. at 114-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority responded in a foot-
note by saying:
In other circumstances, this Court has had no difficulty in distinguishing
between those rulings which relate to "the ultimate question of guilt or
innocence" and those which serve other purposes. Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 490 (1976). We reject the contrary implication of the dissent that.
this Court or other courts are incapable of distinguishing between the lat-
ter and the former.
Id. at 98 n.l
Id. at 115 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
"' See id. at 107 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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government, and could not he corrected with a second trial. While to place
the entire burden on the prosecution would not be unthinkable," it may not
be necessary to protect the legitimate rights of the accused. The Supreme
Court has held and continues to hold that absolute responsibility is to be
borne by the government with respect to its factual case." However, in a
complex procedural environment it seems a proper trade that appellate courts
have the chance to supervise defenses that do not bear directly on the inno-
cence of the accused." Only defendants who raise mid-trial legal defenses
and whose dismissals are overturned on appeal will suffer a second proceed-
ing they would not have suffered before. This cost. may not be especially high
in relation to the price society would have to pay if guilty defendants were
able to avoid punishment by virtue of undeserved legal defenses.
One facet of Scott may even be considered favorable to defendants.
Henceforth it will be possible to resolve legal defenses after the attachment of
jeopardy 96 but prior to verdict without immunizing the defendant from a
second trial if the judgment is found to be in error. Consequently, trial courts
may he more willing seriously to consider such defenses, thereby sparing some
defendants the unnecessary completion of a trial when entitlement to a legal
defense, although still questionable, seems apparent. 47 At the margin, one
might expect. trial courts to be somewhat more receptive to these defenses.
On the other hand, there might be some legitimate fears that after Scott
prosecutors will be lax in presenting the government's best case against legal
defenses at trial clue to an added sense of security associated with their new-
found right to appeal." Worse yet, it is even possible to imagine an un-
scrupulous prosecutor deliberately sacrificing the first trial in an effort to im-
prove the government's presentation at a second." In the extreme, this kind
of prosecutorial neglect or malfeasance would result in unnecessary and un-
fair reprosecutions. If this occurred, one would expect appellate courts to re-
spond by refusing review on double jeopardy grounds. In this regard, an
analogy might be drawn to double jeopardy rules in the mistrial situation.
93 Placing this burden on the prosecution was tacitly endorsed by the dissent,
but the government's adversarial posture at trial was viewed as a sufficient counter-
weight. The dissent said that recent cases teach that "the Government's means of pro-
tecting its vital interest in convicting the guilty is its participation as an adversary at the
criminal trial where it has every opportunity to dissuade the trial court from commit-
ting erroneous rulings favorable to the accused." Id. at 107 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
Whether the prosecution can carry this burden and still adequately protect the public
interest is, of course, open to question.
" 4 See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75-77 (1978); sec also text ac-
companying notes 35-39 supra.
"5 See Comment, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of . Criminal Dismissals,
52 TF,x. L. REv. 303, 349 (1974).
"6 As to attachment of jeopardy, see note 29 supra.
"7 See 2 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE * 461
(1969).
Since prosecutorial interests normally are ill-served by delay, and since pro-
secutors are unlikely to concede defenses, such behavior is likely to be rare.
"" This is precisely the sort of activity against which it is agreed the double
jeopardy clause protects. See text accompanying note 138 infra.
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There, the usual rule that necessary mistrials do not bar reprosecution is ne-
gated by prosecutorial abuse or overreaching.'°" In general, then, assuming
courts exercise their discretion on a case-by-case basis to protect defendants
from abnormal reprosecutions, and acknowledging the public cost of placing
the entire burden of mid-trial judicial error on the prosecution, as well as the
hypothetical benefit to the defendant in certain cases, it is difficult to accept a
rigid view that Scott represents a deliberate, unbalanced shrinking of the
rights of the accused.
It is also difficult to predict the overall impact of Scott. To be sure, trial
courts will feel freer to make mid-trial legal determinations as a result of the
fact/law distinction in Scott. On the other hand, routine interruption of trials
to grant legal defenses would seem unsound simply from the standpoint of
judicial economy, irrespective of constitutional considerations. It does not or-
dinarily make good sense to waste a trial by granting a legal discharge when
all that remains to be done is to submit the case to the jury. Unless one pre-
sumes there to be an unfairly prejudicial influence on the trial judge or a
reviewing court resulting from the stigma of a conviction, it seems that legal
defenses which require development at trial can and will continue to be fairly
and most economically resolved by way of post-conviction rulings. Another
factor that may limit the frequency of use of the Scott rule is the practical
reality that defendants will have less reason to seek mid-trial dismissal in the
absence of the strategic "bonus" of unreviewability. In any event, what is clear
is that Scott does away with the previous boon available to defendants who
were fortunate enough to secure favorable mid-trial discharges for purely
legal reasons. The important issue now, it seems, is to insure that defendants
recognize the risk of reprosecution they assume when invoking such mid-trial
legal defenses.
B. Burks v. United States: Appellate Acquittals
The fact/law distincition found in Scott is augmented by the Supreme
Court's decision in Burks v. United Slates."' In Burks the Court extended pro-
tection against a second trial to a defendant who was acquitted by an appellate
court when it overturned his conviction on grounds of evidentiary insuffi-
ciency.' Prior to Burks, the Supreme Court's construction of the double
jeopardy clause had permitted appellate courts to order new trials when re-
versing criminal convictions, even after finding that, the prosecution's evidence
was insufficient to convict. 10" The principal cases taking this position were
'" See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1976); see generally Note,
Mistrials and Double Jeopardy, 15 Am. GRIM. L. REV. 169 (1977); Schulhoferjeopardy and
Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449 (1977).
1 " 1
 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
112 Id. at 18.
See generally Note. Double Jeopardy: A New Trial After Appellate Reversal for
Insufficient Evidence, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 365 (1964); Thompson. Reversals for Insufficient
Evidence: The Emerging Doctrine of Appellate Acquittal, 8 IND. L. REv. 497 (1975) (discuss-
ing state application).
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Bryan v. United States'° 4 and Yates v. United States. 1°5 In Bryan the Supreme
Court had allowed a new trial under these circumstances, but unfortunately
had finessed the constitutional question by relying on its broad statutory au-
thority as an appellate court to order such further proceedings "as may be
just." i° 6 In Yates the Court supplemented the Bryan reliance on statutory au-
thority by suggesting that a new trial is particularly proper when the defend-
ant requests a new trial as one avenue of appellate relief and assertedly
waives his or her right to object to the second trial.'" The propositions pre-
sented in both Bryan and Yates were rejected by the Court in Burks.'"
1. The Case.
Defendant Burks was convicted by a jury of using a dangerous weapon in
the commission of a bank robbery. 1 D 9
 His principal defense was insanity. The
"4
 338 U.S. 552 (1950). In Bryan the defendant's conviction was set aside by the
court of appeals because the prosecution's evidence was insufficient. That court re-
fused to order a judgment of acquittal as requested by the defendant and instead
remanded for a new trial. 175 F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court
affirmed. It held, first, that the court of appeals was within its statutory authority in
ordering a new trial, 338 U.S. at 560, and then summarily dismissed the defendant's
double jeopardy claim saying, "where the accused successfully seeks review of a convic-
tion, there is no double jeopardy upon a new trial." Id. (quoting Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947)). The authority cited by the Bryan Court offered no real
support for its position, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 12, but this view, with
minor modification, remained the law until 1978. The modification occurred shortly
after Bryan in Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955) (per curiam). In Sapir the
Court, without explanation, ordered acquittal of a defendant who had prevailed in his
first appeal from denial of his trial motion for acquittal. Contrary to the defendant's
request, the court of appeals had ordered a new trial after reversing the trial court.
216 F.2d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 1954). The Supreme Court's opinion was accompanied by
a concurring opinion by Justice Douglas who sought to distinguish Bryan where the
rest of the Court had failed to do so. Justice Douglas focused on the fact that while the
defendant in Sapir had only requested an acquittal on appeal, the defendant in Bryan
had requested a new trial, thus opening the whole record for disposition as might be
just, and inviting a second trial if one appeared to be necessary. 348 U.S. at 374. This
implied waiver by the defendant of his double jeopardy rights seemed to be endorsed,
although not expressly, in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1957).
" 5 354 U.S. 298 (1957). In Yates the Supreme Court ordered acquittals for
some defendants but new trials for others. One contention raised by the defendants on
appeal concerned the insufficiency of the evidence. As justification for remanding for
a new trial, the Court drew on its statutory authority, and emphasized the fact that the
defendants had asked for a new trial. Id. at 327-28.
109
 338 U.S. at 560 (1949). 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976) provides:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may
affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order
of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause
and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or
require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the cir-
cumstances.
(emphasis added).
" 7 354 U.S. at. 327-28 (1957). See also Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373, 374
(1955) (Douglas, J., concurring); Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 425 (1959).
"8
 437 U.S. at 17-18.
"9 Id. at 2.
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defendant's motions for acquittal and new trial had been denied by the trial
court and he appealed from these denials.'" The court of appeals agreed
with the defendant that the government's evidence was insufficient as a mat-
ter of law to refute the insanity plea, but rather than ordering an acquittal the
court of appeals remanded to the district court for a determination of
whether a directed verdict of acquittal should be entered or a new trial or-
dered."' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a de-
fendant may be tried a second time when a reviewing court has determined
that in a prior trial the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict of the
the jury." 2
Recognizing its departure from precedent," 3 the Court held that the
double jeopardy clause barred further prosecution of the defendant."' The
Court stated concisely:
Since we necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's verdict of
acquittal—no matter how erroneous its decision—it is difficult to
conceive how society has any greater interest in retrying a defendant
when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could
not properly have returned a verdict of guilty."'"
The Burks Court thus removed the illogical distinction that had previously
existed between acquittals by the trier of fact and judicial determinations with
the same import occurring at the appellate level. In so doing, the Court
pointed out that there is little room for the prosecution to object to the elimi-
nation of this distinction since it necessarily has had its entitled opportunity to
offer its proof despite its failure adequately to do so.'"
The Burks Court's rejection of the contrary position taken in Bryan and
Yates is unmistakable. The Court disposed of the notion that statutory author-
ity permits second trials after appellate acquittals simply by acknowledging the
overriding role of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy."'
In addition, the Court expressly rejected the Yates rationale which held that by
requesting a new trial a defendant waives his right to assert double jeopardy,
even if his conviction is reversed on evidentiary grounds."s The Court
stressed that it makes no difference that a defendant has sought a new trial as
one of his remedies or even as the sole remedy, because it "cannot be mean-
ingfully said that a person 'waives' his right to a judgment of acquittal by
moving for a new trial." "" The Court. thus ended its previous reliance on
the rather unprincipled idea that a defendant possesses a realistic choice not
to request a new trial on appeal—and thus not to "waive" his or her protec-
"" Id. at 3.
1 " United States v. Burks, 547 F.2c1 968, 970 (6th Cir. 1976).
1 " 437 U.S. at 2.
"3 hl. at 10.
14 Id. at 16-18.
"5 Id. at 16.
Ili 1d.
"7 Id. at 17-1.8.
"8 Id.
" 9 Id. at 17.
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tion against second trials—when confronted with a conviction based on evi-
dence perceived to be insufficient. Henceforth, an appellate acquittal is to
invoke double jeopardy protection presumably in the same manner as the
post-conviction trial court acquittal discussed earlier.'" Reprosecution abso-
lutely will be barred following such a judgment, although a second appeal
seeking to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and thus to reinstate
the guilty verdict, would be allowed. 121
2. Adding Symmetry to the Scott Definition of Acquittal.
In Burks the Supreme Court was careful in its analysis to draw a distinc-
tion between reversals for evidentiary insufficiency, as involved in Burks, and
reversals for trial error which under well-established precedent do not bar
reprosecution.' 22 As seen by the Supreme Court, a reversal for trial error, in
contrast to a finding of evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a deci-
sion to the effect that. the government has failed to prove its case, and there-
fore implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defend-
ant.' 23 Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted
through a judicial process that was defective in some fundamental respect.'"
This rationale distinguishing evidentiary insufficiency from trial error closely
parallels the distinction between factual and legal dismissals adopted in
Scott.' 23 In both cases a prior finding of factual innocence is the essential
element of a double jeopardy defense to subsequent proceedings. And in both
cases legally defective prosecution is distinguished from innocence. It is in-
teresting to note that the Burks opinion, unlike that in Scott, is unanimous, 12 f'
despite the apparent similarity in rationale.
3. Assessment.
The pre-Burks decisions which allowed retrial following a finding that the
prosecution's case had failed warranted overruling. Once the prosecution
truly has failed to prove its factual case, it should not be allowed to profit.
from the trial judge's error in sending the case to the jury. To allow this
procedure is to grant the prosecution the proverbial "second bite at the ap-
ple," and to subject the defendant to the precise evils against which the dou-
ble jeopardy clause protects.
' 2 " The analogy here is to United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (see text
and notes at notes 27-31 supra).
121 Note that here, as in the case of post-conviction acquittals by the trial courts.
if the evidentiary finding were to be overturned on a subsequent appeal and the con-
viction could not he reinstated due to trial error, see note 30 supra, a difficult concep-
tual problem would arise as to use of the appellate acquittal to bar reprosecution. Sec
note 31 supra.
122 437 U.S. at 15-16. The precedent is: United States v, Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672
(1896); and United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
123
 437 U.S. at 15.
124 id.
123 See text and notes at notes 71-84 supra. The Burks opinion recites the defini-
tion of acquittal used in Scott. 437 U.S. at 10.
128 437 U.S. at 2. Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision.
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The Burks Court's logic that an appellate acquittal should be given weight
similar to that of a verdict of innocence is particularly appealing. There is
consistency in allowing acquittals at both the trial and appellate level to sum-
mon double jeopardy protection. An appellate acquittal represents a finding
that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to prove guilt. If indeed
evidence is insufficient, there is no need for a second trial, and a second trial
can serve no purpose other than to permit the prosecution to correct its own
errors at the first proceeding—an impermissible result.'"
The Court also is to he credited for recognizing that there can be no
meaningful waiver of double jeopardy rights when the defendant's alternative
to seeking a new trial on appeal is to remain (allegedly) illegally imprisoned. A
request for a new trial accompanied by an objection to the sufficiency of the
evidence should be viewed as a conditional request. It suggests not that a
second trial is desired even though an acquittal is in order; rather it suggests
that a second trial, if necessary, is an acceptable alternative to penal sanction.
The fact that new-trial motions often are made as a matter of course also
supports the Burks Court's rejection of the "waiver" theory.'" Under the
waiver theory, a defendant would have to refrain from making a new-trial
motion when challenging evidentiary sufficiency on appeal if the defendant
were to be sure of avoiding a second trial following a successful appeal. In
contrast to this "all or nothing" approach, under normal circumstances one
would expect a realistic defendant to seek any relief possible, including a new
trial. It is doubtful that defendants should be penalized for being reasonably
pragmatic and requesting a new trial on appeal. In addition, the "waiver"
theory presumes an element of volition on the part of the defendant. This
would appear to be shortsighted. Frankly, it is hard to imagine that, as a rule,
defendants knowingly weigh the risks of reprosecution when new-trial mo-
tions are made in their behalf. From a practical standpoint alone, therefore,
Burks was correct in overruling the prior, waiver theory.
As a result of Burks, one might expect a decline in appellate court will-
ingness to reverse judgments on evidentiary grounds. Following this case, ap-
pellate reversal for evidentiary insufficiency takes on a constitutional signifi-
cance it previously did not have. Quite obviously, appellate courts will be less
likely to find the evidence insufficient in marginal cases when the conse-
quence of such judgment is to immunize the defendant from any possibilty of
reprosecution. 12 " Nevertheless, whatever the change in judicial behavior may
127 See. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975) (see text at note 138
infra).
128 See United States v. Wiley, 517 F.2d 1212, 1217 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("A
new trial waiver doctrine bases vital determinations affecting the rights of the accused
on what arc often routine post trial motions in the alternative for a new trial filed by
appointed counsel.").
12" in Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978), which was decided with Burks, and
which extended the Burks principle to state courts, it was implied at oral argument that
appellate courts sometimes order new trials under the guise of insufficient evidence.
not because proof has clearly failed, but rather "in the interests of justice." 22 CRIM. L.
REP. (BNA) 4116-17 (1977).
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be, the Burks Court did not seem wary of the result. The Court rested its lack
of concern on the fact that an appellate court's role is "quite limited" with
regard to factual matters, and that, presumably, appellate acquittals will be
confined to cases where the prosecution's failure is clear.' 3" In any event, a
need for appellate courts to refine their approach to fact questions seems
preferable to the conceptual inconsistency that preceded Burks.
III. FACT VERSUS LAW: SOMETHING NEW, OR JusT ANOTHER EXCEPTION?
Together, Scott and Burks denote a significant shift in the Supreme
Court's construction of post-acquittal double jeopardy protection, a shift that
seems to represent a rational and pragmatic approach to die realities of crim-
inal prosecutions. By contrast, earlier decisions in this area, while often reach-
ing rational results, were characterized by almost ritualistic emphasis on the
notion that all second trials, per se, offend the double jeopardy clause, a rule
honored as often in the breach as in the acceptance. The balance of this note
seeks to highlight this shift in emphasis.
A. Background: The "Per Se" Rule
At common law, the protection against double jeopardy not only prohib-
ited multiple punishments for the same offense, but also prohibited multiple
trials without regard to the possibility of punishment."' In other words, it
was the second trial itself, regardless of its outcome, that violated the ancient
form of protection against. double jeopardy. 132 So strong was this feeling
against second trials that at one time a convicted defendant was unable even
to appeal his conviction in an effort to seek a new trial.' 33
 This created an
irony once described as guaranteeing the defendant the right to be hung to
protect. him from the danger of a second trial.' 34
The concept. of refusing all second trials even after an assertedly errone-
ous conviction was soon rejected in this country." 5
 Nevertheless, the idea
that all second trials, per se, offend double jeopardy protection has permeated
most if not all Supreme Court double jeopardy decisions.'" Based on the
collection of cases in this area, the rationale against second trials, per se, ap-
la" 07 U.S. at 17. The Court. in Burks, stated that, "[w]hile this is not the
appropriate occasion to re-examine in detail the standards for appellate reversal on
grounds of insufficient evidence, it is apparent that such a decision will be confined to
cases where the prosecution's failure is clear." Id.
See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184. 189 (1957); United States v.
Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (1834); see generally Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials
and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV, 1, 5 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Mayers &
Yarbrough].
132
133 See United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (1834). Sec also authorities cited
at note 131 supra.
1 " See United States v. Keen, 26 F. Cas. 686, 690 (1839); United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978).
' 35 See United States v. Ball. 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896).
131; See , 	 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975).
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pears to he threefold. First., the Court has suggested that the mere fact of a
second trial exposes a defendant. to unnecessary personal strain and
ordeal."' Second, it is thought that a second trial would unfairly prejudice
the defendant by wearing down his defense and by permitting the prosecu-
tion to re-examine the weaknesses in its first presentation in order to
strengthen the second.'" And third, the Court has mentioned that a second
trial would disserve the defendant's legitimate interest in the finality of an
acquittal or other discharge.'"
It is easy to appreciate the merit of these three justifications. What. is
more difficult, however, is to attempt to reconcile them with the reality of
double jeopardy jurisprudence. Even prior to Sara, defendants were subjected
to reprosecutions under several exceptions to the general principle that sec-
ond trials, per se, will not be tolerated. For example, reprosecution has long
been permitted when a mistrial is declared for "manifest necessity,""" and, as
previously mentioned, when a defendant successfully appeals his con-
viction.' One seeks in vain for an explanation of these results in terms of
the threefold justification above. 142 Rather, what seems to be at work is an
almost unspoken effort to balance the elliptical dislike for second trials with
practical necessity. What is unfortunate is that the Court has never officially
acknowledged the general applicability of this balancing approach. And, as a
result, for guidance practitioners are left with the general notion that second
trials are prohibited, subject to the possibility that the next case may provide
another exception. In this regard, commentators have called for official rec-
ognition of the balancing approach and less doctrinaire reliance on the am-
biguous idea that second trials, per se,. are what offend the double jeopardy
clause.' 43 It is interesting to note how the recent decisions appear against this
background.
I" See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). In Green the Court
enunciated this interest in the following, frequently cited paragraph:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarassmem,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of'
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.
Id.
138 See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
' 3" Id. See also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28. 33 (1978); United States v. join, 400
U.S. 470, 479 (1970) (plurality opinion). But see justice Brennan's dissent in United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 104 (1978), where he said: "rw/hile the Double Jeopardy
Clause often has the effect of protecting the accused's interest in the finality of particu-
lar favorable determinations, this is not its purpose."
'" See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). See generally
Note, Mistrials and Double Jeopardy, 15 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 169 (1977).
141 See text and note at note 122 supra.
'" See Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 131, at 12.
' 43 See, e.g., Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 131, at 14; Comment, Double
Jeopardy and Government Appeals of Criminal Dismissals, 52 TEx. L. Rev. 303, 313 (1974).
950	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:925
B. Scott and Burks: The Common Theme
In both Scott and Burks the availability of a double jeopardy defense de-
pends on the same substantive inquiry, namely, whether factual elements of
the offense have been resolved in the defendant's favor. Thus, these cases
have a common theme despite their outwardly opposite results from the
viewpoints of the respective defendants.'" Prior to these cases, the avail-
ability of a double jeopardy defense was relatively unaffected by any distinc-
tion between factual and legal issues. The availability of the defense turned
more on the timing of the judgment in question than on its substantive im-
pori.145 In the future, the substantive fact/law inquiry mandated by Scott and
Burks will be an equally important, threshold consideration. Acquittal, factual
dismissal, and reversal for insufficient evidence all indicate that the defendant
has successfully confronted the prosecution's proof at least once. This success
on the merits appears to have become a necessary antecedent to the raising of
a valid double jeopardy defense following receipt of a favorable judgment.
The fact/law distinction that emerges from Scott and Burks does more
than create another exception to the alleged rule that second trials, per se, are
unconstitutional; it redefines the boundaries of post-acquittal double jeopardy
protection. By casting emphasis on the substantive ground of discharge, em-
phasis necessarily is removed from the narrow issue of second trials, per se.
To be sure, earlier decisions permitting exceptions to the general rule that
second trials, per se, are illegal were sometimes characterized by recognition
of the need in some cases for compromise between the defendant's right to
avoid second trials and the public's interest in justice.'" The recognized
need for occasional compromise is a theme in Scott as well. Nevertheless, Scott
reaches further, and suggests that defendants who raise legal defenses stand
on an altogether different footing than do those who contest their factual
guilt. The Scott court not only addresses the need to balance the public's right
with respect to the individual's, but also questions the individual's entitlement,
ab initio, to the right. Taken to its logical extreme, this differentiation between
fact and law, while still imposing upon the prosecution the continuing burden
of proof on questions related to guilt, causes strictly legal issues to become
more or less neutral as between defense and prosecution. Both parties share
the duty to produce a legally "right" decision, and, in the case of these purely
legal questions, ultimate double jeopardy protection attaches only after final
144 T hey have outwardly opposite results in the sense that one defendant, Scott,
was disadvantaged by the fact/law distinction, while the other, Burks, had it used to his
advantage.
'" See discussion in text accompanying notes 21-31 supra.
' 4" See, e.g., United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) ("It would be a
high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from
punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the pro-
ceedings leading to conviction."); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) ("a de-
fendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some
instances be subordinated to the public's interest. in fair trials designed to end in just.
judgments.").
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resolution of the legal issues.' 47 One questions whether the idea that second
trials are inherently evil can coexist with an exception of this scope.
As mentioned earlier, the Scott decision is likely to be controversial. It will
indeed expose some new defendants to the possibility of a second trial; how-
ever, it is worth pondering whether this neutral treatment of legal issues
necessarily is inconsistent with individual rights against oppressive re-
prosecution. It is harder to fault the prosecutor's imperfection in regard to
subtle legal questions than with respect to the primary issues of proof. It is
harder still to equate such technical imperfection with the unchecked tyranny
one assumes to be at the root of double jeopardy protection. Furthermore, as
illustrated by Burks, the Supreme Court is willing to apply the fact/law distinc-
tion for the benefit of the defendant as well as the government. This fact
tends to allay fears that. the distinction is one-sided, benefiting only the gov-
ernment. There is an important, simply pragmatic side of the fact/law distinc-
tion and the corresponding neutral treatment of purely legal questions. As
has been noted: "A criminal prosecution is more than a game in which the
Government may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its officers
have not played according to rule." '" This may be a silent keynote in the
fact/law distinction. With the recent decisions, the Court seems to come to
grips with the fact that criminal prosecutions are not necessarily one-sided
battles pitting the government against powerless individuals. On the contrary,
to the credit of the American criminal justice system the government and the
criminal defendant are often well-matched adversaries. It is proper that the
rule against double jeopardy followed by the courts reflects this reality.
CONCLUSION
After Scott and Burks, the crucial inquiry in a post-acquittal double
jeopardy case is whether factual elements of the offense have been resolved in the
defendant's favor. These elements include factual defenses the non-existence
of which is an element of every offense. No longer will once-successful
claims to legal immunity suffice to invoke double jeopardy protection.
As noted, there are several questions that remain to be answered empirically and
147 One presumes. naturally, that once a legal question has been resolved by the
highest authority available, or when an appeal is not sought, double jeopardy protec-
tion is invoked.
148 Fong Foo v. United States. 369 U.S. 141, 146 (1962) (Clark. J., dissenting)
(quoting McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927)). Consider also the dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Holmes in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134-39 (1940),
in which he endorsed the concept of continuing jeopardy, which concept permits any
proceedings necessary to achieve a final determination of either factual or legal mat-
ters, and after which final determination double jeopardy protection attaches. Of in-
terest in relation to the point raised in the text is Justice Holmes' extremely pragmatic
approach. He said: "At the present time in this country there is more danger that
criminals will escape than that they will be subjected to tyranny." 195 U.S. at 134. The
concept of continuing jeopardy has never received the endorsement of a majority of
the Supreme Court. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90 n.6 (1978).
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judicially following these decisions."" What is clear is that with these cases the
Supreme Court has confirmed an official departure from the notion that all second
trials offend the double jeopardy clause, and is moving toward a commonsense
evaluation of the shifting equities in criminal prosecutions, a movement which,
through emphasis on substance over form, may in the long run profit public and
individual interests alike.
JASON WILEY KENT
14 " The questions to be answered empirically are; (1) whether trial courts will be
more receptive to legal defenses after Scott (see text accompanying notes 96-97 supra);
(2) whether appellate courts will become less willing to reverse convictions on eviden-
tiary grounds after Burks (see text accompanying notes 129-30 supra); and (3) whether
it will become necessary to create rules to insure against prosecutorial neglect in oppos-
ing legal defenses at trial (see text at notes 98-99 supra). Questions to be answered
judicially are, for example, whether post-conviction, trial court acquittals and appellate
acquittals which are overturned on appeal bar further proceedings when convictions
cannot be reinstated due to trial error (see notes 31 & 121 supra); and whether further
proceedings should be barred in cases where pre-trial acquittals occur on the basis of
stipulated facts or following pre-trial factual hearings (see note 26 supra).
